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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
1. First Attempt to Change Comprehensive Plan Designation on Property. 
The property involved in this suit is owned by Burns Holdings, LLC ("Burns"), where 
three attempts to change Madison County's comprehensive plan designation on the property has 
been made, requesting a change from an agriculture designation to a commercial andlor light 
industrial designation. This began in 1979 when the original property owner, Bruce Shirley, sold 
property located near the north Rexburg interchange to Gayle and Grant Taylor of Rexburg, 
~daho.' On April 10,2003, a public hearing was held with the Madison County Planning and 
Zoning Commission ("Commission") wherein the owner asked that this property's comprehensive 
plan designation be changed from agricultural to comrner~ial.~ The Commission was concerned 
with "safety issues of the overpass, the traffic, infrastructure and the de~elo~ment ."~ The 
Commission then unanimously denied the request because of safety problems.4 On April 14,2003, 
the comprehensive plan change then went before the Board of Madison County Commissioners 
("Board') where Ms. Taylor indicated she owned 46.8 acres on the north interchange and was 
requesting approval of the comprehensive plan change to commercial use.5 Among other 
opposition, the City of Rexburg appeared and requested that it be denied because it did not 
confonn to the present general principals for change at the north area of the county.6 Board 
member Passey noted that although he believed this area would become commercial in the future, 
' R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 2-3 
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab I at 3 
R. Vol 4 Bums Tab 1 at 4 
Id 
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 2 at 3. 
R. Vol 4 Bums Tab 2 at 3. 
Respondent's Brief - Page 1 
he was against it because of safety  issue^.^ Board member Muir stated his "main concerns were 
access, adequate vision, safety and [the] number of accidents in this area."' The Board then 
unanimously denied the proposed comprehensive plan change because "it was not in harmony 
with Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance [.I"' 
2. Second Attempt to Change Comprehensive Plan Designation on Property. 
On January 22,2004, a public hearing was again held for the property at issue here, 
wherein Gayle and Grant Taylor again requested a comprehensive plan change designation on 
their property from agricultural to light industrial zoning.I0 The Commission voted to allow the 
comprehensive plan change to light industrial by a vote of four in favor and three against.'' 
Concerns of the two Commission members who voted against it were traffic, and dangers of the 
road.'' Another Cominission member wasnot convinced that a light industrial zoning is needed 
on the north interchange of Rexhurg. The zoning hearing was held right after the above mentioned 
first hearing, where the Taylors requested the land next be re-zoned from agricultural to light 
industria1.l3 The Commission recommended to allow for a light industrial zoning, with four 
voting for it and three against it, for the same reasons stated above.14 
On February 17,2004, the Board held a public hearing on the Taylor property 
comprehensive zone change.I5 After hearing public testimony on the matter and after deliberations, 
the Board unanimously denied Taylors' application for proposed amendment of the Madison 
7 R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 2 at 4. 
* R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 2 at 4. ' R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 2 at 4. Note, that the third Board member, Commissioner Sommer, was excused due to illness in 
his family (R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 2 at 1). 
l o  R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 2. " R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 7. 
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 6. 
l 3  R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 7. 
l4 R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 9. 
I S  R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 8 at p.4, LL.1 through p.5, LL.5. 
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County comprehensive plan, which attempted to add an industrial zone near the north Rexburg 
interchange on October 20, 2004.16 The reasons for the denial were: the negative impact on 
property rights; the negative impact on adjacent residential neighborhoods; barriers to commercial 
usage; access difficulties regarding transportation; negative impact on surrounding housing; 
improper spot zoning; the zoning is not harmonious with the comprehensive plan in that the 
objective in Madison County is to preserve agricultural lands; and, it was not in the best interest of 
the people of Madison C ~ u n t y . ' ~  
On April 16,2004, Burns executed a Warranty Deed on the Taylor property, and on 
September 27,2004, Burns executed another Warranty Deed on the Newman property, buying the 
property at issue in this case.'' 
3. Third Attempt to Change Comprehensive Plan Designation on Property. 
On November 22,2004, Bums first appeared and filed a request for a comprehensive plan 
designation change on the property they now own-the same property subject to the prior two 
attempts-from transitional agricultural to commercial and ind~strial. '~ Burns further requested a 
zone change from agricultural to commercial, with an imbedded industrial zone." The property 
was described as approximately 50 acres located on the northwest corner of the intersection of 
Highway 20 and Salem Highway, located in Madison County, idaho.'' The proposed use for the 
industrial property by Bums was to establish a new concrete production facility.22 The concrete 
production facility proposed for the property would consist of a concrete batch plant, a small truck 
l6 R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 7 at 29. 
" R. Vol. 4 Bum Tab 7 at 26-28. 
'' R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 12, attachment #5 and#6. 
R. Val. 4 Bums Tab 12, Madison County Zone Change Application. 
2o Id. 
Vol. 4 Bums Tab 12, Letter to Madison County Planning & Zoning &om Bums dated November 19,2004. 
22 Id. 
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shop, and an office building.23 The concrete batch plant would mix aggregates, cement, and water 
together to produce a concrete product that is delivered to jobsites in concrete mixer trucks.24 
On December 16,2004, a public hearing was held before the Commission regarding 
Bums' comprehensive plan change and zone change requests on their property.25 That same night, 
Walters Concrete was also asking for a comprehensive plan and zone change on property they 
owned in  exb bur^.'^ Burns' request was to change the comprehensive plan's designation and 
zoning designation from transitional agricultural to commercial with light i nd~s t r i a l .~~  After 
review of Bums' application, the Commission recommended approval by a nine to one vote for the 
comprehensive plan change, and tabled the zone change for a later date.28 On January 13,2005, a 
public hearing was held regarding the zone change, wherein after reviewing the Bums' application, 
the zone change was recommended for approval by the Commission by a six to one vote.29 
The recommendation then went to the Board wherein a public hearing on the Bums' 
comprehensive plan and zone change was held on February 28,2005.~' After discussion, the 
decision was tabled by the Board until March 7,2005.~' On March 7,2005, the Board voted two to 
one to deny the Burns comprehensive plan change, thus, there was no need to decide the proposed 
Bums' zone change.32 The Board issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 1 1, 
2005, confirming the denial to change the designation of the comprehensive plan on Bums' 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
'* R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 14 
" R. Vo1.4 Walters Tab 10. 
27 R. Vo1.4 Burns Tab 14. 
'* R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 17, R Vol. 4 Burns Tab 14 at 18. 
29 R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 22. 
30 R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 26 at 1; R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 27 at 1. 
31 R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 26 at 13; R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 27 at 34. 
32 R. VOI. 4 Bums Tab 28 
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property from agricultural to commercial and light indu~tr ia l .~~ The reasons the Board gave for its 
denial were: the negative impact on property rights, particularly property values; the close 
proximity to several substantial residential neighborhoods and the negative impact on thein; 
serious access difficulties regarding transportation especially where "a substantial portion of 
proposed new traffic to the site will include heavily laden cement and delivery vehicles"; impact 
on recreation regarding the site's location on a "major access route to the St. Anthony sand dunes 
[;I" impact on the ncighborhood residential uses; the plan would require "pieccmeal zoning" 
which "does not allow the County to comply with its State mandated responsibility to plan 
comprehensively, particularly in the area of coin~nunity design. The County should continue to 
group industrial uses, and aim them toward areas where city services are available [;I" 
implementation of the proposed amendment would require a "substantial rewrite" of the existing 
comprehensive plan; the zoning is not harmonious with the comprehensive plan in the areas of 
"agricultural lands, industrial uses, economic development, transportation and community design 
[;I" and, it is not in the best interest of the people of Madison 
4. Burns' First Petition for Judicial Review. 
Prior to the Board's April 1 1,2005 decision denying Burns' application for comprehensive 
plan change, Burns preemptively filed its first Petition For Judicial Review on April 1 , 2 0 0 5 . ~ ~  
Bums argued the Board's actions were "in violation of Constitutional and Statutory provisions, or 
in excess of the Board's statutory authority, were made upon unlawful procedure, were not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and were arbitrary, capricious, and an 
l3 R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 29 at 42. 
" R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 29 at 38-41. 
'' R. Vol. 1 at 1-4. 
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abuse of di~cretion."~~ After the Board's written findings were issued on April 11,2005, Burns 
again filed another Petition for Judicial Review on May 4 , 2 0 0 5 , ~ ~  arguing the Board's actions 
were made upon unlawhl procedure, the Board did not issue written decisions with respect to the 
zone change, Bums' rights under the due process clause of the Constitution were violated, and one 
of the Board members had a conflict of interest in this matter.38 
Madison County's Deputy Prosecutor, Penny J. Stanford, answcred with affirmative 
defenses and counterclaims on May 12,2005, alleging no violations of procedure or law occurred 
as outlined by Bums then filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment on October 4,2005.~' The County replied by way of its Respondent's Reply Brief on 
November 30,2005.~' Bums then filed Bums' Response to the County's Reply Brief dated 
January 17 ,2006.~~ 
The parties set the date of March 13,2006, for oral arguments to be heard before the district 
Before oral arguments however, the district court judge, the Honorable Brent Moss, met 
with both attorneys in chambers, wherein "the parties agreed and stipulated that this matter is 
properly remanded back to the Board of County Commissioners The Court's Order 
also noted the parties agreed that the Board may re-address any specific issues or the entire 
36 R. Vol. 1 at 3. 
'' The first Petition For Judicial Review, dated April 1,2005, was in Case No.: CV-05-255 (R. Vol. 1 at 1); the second, 
dated May 3,2005, was in Case No.: CV-05-340 (R. Vol. 1 at 10). These were later consolidated by Order into 
CV-05-255, on June 9,2005 (R. Vol. 1 at 96-98).. 
R. Vol. 1 at 10-15. 
'" R. Vol. 1 at 10-29. 
40 R. VOI. 1 at 104. 
" R. Vol. 1 at 152. 
" R. Vol. 2 at 273. 
43 R. Vo1. 2 at 328-329. 
44 R. Vol. 2 at 331-333. Significantly, the Order and record are absent of any statements raised by Burns in its 
Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, pp. 6-9, as to what Judge Moss said or did not say while in 
chambers. The Order and record just state both parties simply stipulated to a remand back to the Board (R. Vol. 2 at 
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matter?' The district court also preserved the issue of attorney's fees to be addressed at a later 
time.46 
On April 13,2006, the Board met for the purpose to again completely review the Burns 
hearing (as well as Walters) from February 28,2005, and to make another decision regarding the 
proposed comprehensive plan change and, if accepted, then decide the proposed zone change?7 
There, the Board again considered all transportation plans and safety analyses submitted, collision 
data from the Idaho Transportation Department, aerial maps, Commission's Findings of Fact, 
copies of the appeal record submitted to the district court, the minutes submitted at the February 28, 
2005 public hearing, all letters and petitions from the citizens who submitted information at that 
hearing, and the written findings the Board issued on August 11,2005.~~ The Board also reviewed 
the Walters matter they heard before the Burns matter on February 28, 2005, re-listened to the CD 
of Mr. Pline's presentation, and re-reviewed copies of the Madison County zoning ordinance and 
Madison County comprehensive plan.49 The Board also reviewed the component analysis as 
required by state law, going through each individual component outlined in Idaho Code 5 
67-6508.'~ 
Affer reviewing all the transcripts, exhibits, presentations, documents and video presented 
again, the Board voted two to one to deny Bums' proposed comprehensive plan change, making a 
decision on the proposed zone change unnecessary.51 The Board issued its written Findings of 
45 id. 
" R. Vol. 2 at 332. 
47 R. VO!. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 5, April 13,2006 
(initially inadvertently dated February 13,2006), Public Hearing transcript, at p.1, LL. 1-13. 
Id. at p.3, LL.8-25; p.4, LL.1-25; p.5, LL.1. 
49 Id. 
Id. at p.12, LL.1-20; p.14, LL.4 through p.53, LL.6 
51 id. aat p.69, LL.22 through p.72, LL.9. 
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Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 1 , 2 0 0 6 . ~ ~  The reasons outlined by the Board for the denial 
include, in pertinent part, the following:53 
Property rights. The negative impact on property rights because approval would require 
inserting "an island of industrial zoning into the middle of residential and agricultural properties 
[;I" and is improper per Idaho Code $ 67-6508(a); 
r Population. The close proximity to several substantial residential neighborhoods and the 
negative impact on them. Further, residential trends in the area by the site would be ncgatively 
altered; 
Land Use. A cement batch plant is not compatible next to housing, and the proposed 
amendment is "merely reactive" and would be "improper spot zoning [;I" 
Public Services, Facilities and Utilities. The comprehensive plan requires industrial uses 
be located where they can be "supplied with public services such as cities can provide" and Bums' 
facility has no services available to it; 
Transportation. The north highway interchange near the proposed site has "sight and 
other inadequacies" which worsen where a substantial portion of the new traffic using the access 
would be heavy cement and delivery vehicles; 
Recreation. Impact from the site's location on a "major access route to the St. Anthony 
Sand Dunes [;I" 
Housing. The proposcd amendment would have a negative overall impact on the 
neighborhood residential uses, and if the property is no longer used, it should be used as 
residential; 
52 R. Vo1.3 at 394; 437; R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item 
number 6, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Madison 
County, Idaho, dated June 1,2006. 
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Community Design. The proposed plan would require "improper spot zoning" and not 
allow for the grouping of industrial areas nor aim them towards city services. Further, variations 
from the comprehensive plan would not allow for the beautification of the community where this 
location is'a major doorway into Madison County, per Idaho Code 5 67-6508(m); 
Implementation. Implementation of the proposed amendment would require a 
"substantial rewrite" of the existing comprehensive plan; 
The proposed amendment is not harmonious with the comprehensive plan in the areas of 
"property rights, population, land use, public services, facilities and utilities, transportation, 
community design and implementation, and should be denied [;I" and, 
It is not in the best interest of the people of Madison County. 
5. Burns' Second Petition for Judicial Review. 
Bums then filed an Amended Petition for Judicial Review on approximately July 3 , 2 0 0 6 . ~ ~  
After both parties fully briefed the issues, Judge Moss issued his Decision On Review dated 
October 17,2006, affirming the Board's June 1,2006 decision.55 In the court's Decision On 
Review, the district court specifically held that the Board did not violate any constitutional or 
statutory provisions, nor did the Board exceed its statutory The court held that the 
Board's decision was not made upon unlawful procedure and was supported by substantial 
evidence after reviewing the record as a whole and the component analysis required by Idaho Code 
§ 67-6508.~~ Finally, the court held the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse 
of di~cret ion.~~ Notwithstanding, the district court held that Bums was entitled to an award of 
53 Id., at pp.20-23. 
"R. Vol. 2 at 341-342. 
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partial attorney's fees under Idaho Code 5 12-121, due to a misinterpretation of evidence and a 
possible conflict of interest on the Board's part.59 Therefore the court held that Bums was a 
prevailing party only as of March 13,2006.'~ 
Bums filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court dated November 28,2006." 
Upon Madison County motioning the district court to reconsider the attorney's fees issue, and after 
hearing argument on the same, the district court made its Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to 
Reconsider Attorney's Fee Award on January 23,2007, wherein the district court held the Board 
had in fact prevailed on all issues and the record did not in fact support any finding that the actions 
taken by the Board were pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, per Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) and Idaho Code $12-121." Hence, the court's prior decision to award 
attorney's fees to Burns was erroneously made and the court denied Bums' Motion for ~ e e s . ~ ~  
The district court made its Order Affirming Decision of County Board of County 
Commissioners and Denying Request for Attorney's Fees on January 23 ,2007.~~ After Bums' 
Motion for Reconsideration, the district court again reaffirmed itself by Order dated May 3,2007, 
maintaining its position outlined in its previous January 23, 2007 Order, and firther stated that 
"Idaho Code 5 12-121 sets out a rigorous standard that Burns fails to e~tablish."~~ 
Bums filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to this Court dated June 7,2007, additionally 
arguing whether it is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-1 1 7 . ~ ~  
Respondent's Brief - Page 10 
11. ISSUES ON  APPEAL^^ 
1. Was the Commission's decision on the Burns application results-oriented in light 
of the Commission's decision on the Walters, which was decided at the same time? 
2. Should the decision in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137 
Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002) be extended to require that oral testimony of lay 
witnesses in opposition to official and expert reports be supported by other credible 
evidence before such lay testinlony can be adopted? 
3. Was the Commission's decision arbitrary and capricious and not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole? 
4. Has a substantial right of Burns been prejudiced? 
5. Is Burns entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal to the district court 
pursuant to ldaho Code 12-1 17, and/or an award of attorney's fees on appeal to 
this court? 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Would granting Burns' request for a comprehensive plan change amount to invalid 
spot zoning? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. General Standard of Review on Appeal from District Courts to Appellate Courts. 
The following statutes and court rules govern judicial review in Idaho. In 1975, the Idaho 
legislature adopted an extensive recodification of the laws in this State relating to planning and 
zoning, in the Local Planning Act of 1 9 7 5 . ~ ~  This Local Land Use Planning Act of 1975 
("LLUPA") allows for judicial review under the provisions of the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act ("APA").~~ The APA applies to judicial review of "an agency," which it defines as 
a "state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine 
"As presented in Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, pp.10-I1 
Gump~echt v Cily of Coeur d' Alene, 104 Idaho 615,617,661 P.2d 1214,121 6 (Idaho 1983). 
69 ldaho Code $5  67-6519(4), 67-6521(1)(d). 
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contested cases . . . ."" In addition to LLUPA and the APA:' judicial review is also governed by 
Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil ~ r o c e d u r e . ~ ~  Amendments to the comprehensive plan done by 
the Board are "quasi-judicial" actions and are subject to review under LLUPA and the APA.'~ 
Since LLUPA adopts the judicial review provisions of the APA for review of these quasi- 
judicial actions, we must turn to the standards set out by the APA for judicial review, found in 
Idaho Code 5 67-5279. Section 67-5279(3) sets forth the standard of review for this Court. It 
states as follows: 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affinn the agency action 
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawfil procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall he set aside, in whole or in 
part, and remanded for other proceedings as n e c c ~ s a r ~ . ~ ~  
. . .  
if this Court finds the underlying decision was in violation of any provision of Idaho Code 
5 67-5279(3)(a)-(e), Bums must then show that a "substantial right" has been prejudiced per Idaho 
Code 5 67-5279(4). 
70 Idaho Code $ 67-5201(2); Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 182,938 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Idaho 1997). 
71 The APA is codified in Idaho Code 5 8  67-5201 to 67-5292, as first enacted in 1965 and subsequently amended in 
1992. 
72 Which mles largely outline timeframes to follow unless otherwise prescribed by statute. See I.R.C.P. 84(b)(l). 
73 ~eegenemlly  Cooper v. Ada County Commissioners, 101 Idaho 407,410-41 1,614 P.2d 947,950-951 (Idaho 1980). 
"Idaho Code $67-5279(3). 
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"In a subsequent appeal from a district court's decision in which the district court was 
acting in its appellate capacity under the Administrative Procedure's Act (APA), the Supreme 
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision."75 As to the facts, 
this Court reviews them in the same manner as the district court, in that "[tlhe standards governing 
judicial review in a case involving the LLUPA provide that this Court does not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented."76 Indeed, "[iJt is not 
the role of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence."77 "[Tlhis Court defers to the agency's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneou~."~~ "A strong presumption of validity favors an 
agency's actions."79 
B. The Board's decision on the Burns' application was not results-oriented in light of 
the Board's decision on the Walters' application, which was decided at the same 
time!' 
Burns begins by arguing the Board's decision was "results-oriented" when compared to 
another Board decision in ~a l te rs . "  Burns aims this at the arbitrary and capricious standard set 
forth in the APA." This Court has held, "there is a strong presumption favoring the validity of the 
action of zoning boards and we have upheld the validity of their actions whenever they are free 
from capriciousness, arbitrariness, or discriminati~n."~~ This standard applies to the exercise of 
discretion by the Board and was summed up as follows: 
This standard is often phrased in the negative: an agency decision would be 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion if it were not based on those factors 
75 Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780,784,86 P.3d 494,498 (Idaho 2004). 
76 Fischer V. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,352, 109 P.3d 1091,1094 (Idaho 2005). 
77 Duvisco Foods Inf 'I lnc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784,790,118 P.3d 1 16,122 (Idaho 2005). 
78 Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,352, 109 P.3d 1091,1094 (Idaho 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
79 young ~lectr ic  Sign Co. v. State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804,807,25 P.3d 117,120 (Idaho 2001). 
The Madison County Board of County Commissioners is regarded as the "Board" herein; the Madison County ~. 
Planning and Zoning Commission is regarded as the "Commission" herein. 
R. Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, p.14. 
82 Id -... 
83SOUth Forlc Coalition v Board of Comrnissione/ S of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857,860,792 P.2d 882,885 
(Idaho 1990). 
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that the legislature though relevant, ignored an important aspect of the problem, 
provided an explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the agency, or 
involved a clear error of judgment. The focus of this inquiry is on the methods by 
which the agency arrived at its decision: for example, did the agency not only 
consider all the right questions, did it consider some wrong ones? Does the 
relationship between the facts found @nd the conclusion reached reveal gaps in the 
logic of the reasoning process? Again, the question of judicial review largcly 
devolves into question of whether the agency was rea~onable .~~ 
In Madison County, a comprehensive plan change and a zone change begins with the 
Commission. The Commission's duty is to recommend findings to the Board, who then may 
accept, deny, or hold a public hearing on the proposed amendment to the colnprehensive plan or 
zone change." A comprehensive plan, although not being a legally controlling zoning law, serves 
as a guide to the Commission and Board charged with making zoning decisions.86 The Board 
cannot ignore the Madison County comprehensive plan when adopting or amending zoning 
 ordinance^.^^ Bums spends some time outlining its application and comparing it to the Walters 
application, heard the same evening by the ~ o a r d . ' ~  In Walters' case, their application was made 
on October 4,2004.'~ The street address of the property is 4626 South 2860 West and consists of 
approxilnately 1 19 acres.90 This property was transitional two/agriculture and the northwest 
comer of the property is zoned industrial and adjoins existing industrial zoning." Access to and 
fiom the property would be using the first of three main entrances and exitsto Rexburg, known as 
the south exit located approximately one-half a mile away.92 Also, this property's north side 
84 Michael S. Gillmore &Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act: a Primer for thePractitioner, 30 
Idaho L. Rev. 273 365 (1993). 
Idaho Code $67-651 1(b). 
'"one v. C i y  ofLewiston, 107 Idaho 844,850,693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Idaho 1984). 
87 Id. 
R. Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, pp. 14-19. 
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borders industrial, bark plants and transitional two The property across the roadway to 
the west is zoned coinmercia~.~~ The Walters' site was to be used for the operation of a gravel pit 
with no buildings placed on the property.95 
In comparison, Burns' application was dated Nove~nber 19, 2 0 0 4 , ~ ~  and is located at 
approximately 3000 ~01th. '~ This would place the two properties approximately six miles and 
three overpasses (as noted below) apart from each other. Bums' property consisted of 
approximately 50 acres and is not surrounded or bordered by commercial property.98 
There are three interchanges that are commonly used in the City of Rexburg: the south 
interchange, the middle interchange and the north inter~hange.'~ Of them, the south and middle 
interchanges have commercial/indusbrid uses around them; the north does not.Io0 The fact is, 
seeing as the applicants' locations are drastically different, as are the proposed uses, the 
comprehensive plan treats them differently. From Appellant's Opening Brief, Appendixes A-C 
show there are no industrial or commercial uses near the north interchange where Bums proposed 
its site. It was argued correctly by Madison County in front of the district court that this area 
remains pristine.'0' 
The dissimilarities continue between the two applicants, and are best contrasted as set out 
by the Board in their Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision in each case. For 
example, with Waiters, the Board found:'02 
" I d  atpp. 10-11. 
" Id. atp.13. 
'* R. Vo!. 4 Waiters Tab 4. 
96 R. Voi. 4 Bums Tab 12. 
" R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 14. 
" R. Vo!. 4 Bums Tab 12. 
99 R, Transcript from August 11,2006, hearing before Judge Moss, Case No. CV-2005-255, p.22, LL.ll-15. 
loo Id.. 0.22. LL.15-23. , 
lo' Id., p.24, LL.2-8. 
'02 The Waiters Findings of Fact and Conclusio~~s of Law by. the Board could not be found in the record, so a reference 
is made to the Respondent's Reply Brief instead (R. Vol. 1 at 189). 
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The proposed amendment seeks the addition of a commercial and light industrial 
zone near State Highway 191 where it intersects with 4700 South. The property 
sought to be rezoned is bounded on the south by 4700 South and on the east by 
State Highway 191, U. S. Highway 20, and by the rail lines of the Eastern Idaho 
Railroad. Six industrial areas exist within the surrounding area: Mountain West 
Bark, commonly referred to as "The Bark Plant," is in an industrial zone located to 
the north of the site; Western Fence, Inc., is a non-conforming use located west of 
the site; Benchmark Potato is a non-conforming use located west by southwest of 
the site; Mr. Driveline is a non-conforming use located south of the site; Edstrom 
Gravel Pit is a non-conforming use located east by northeast of the site. (Findings 
pp. 13-14). 
For Bums, the Board found:'03 
The project site currently is planned and zoned as agricultural and historically has 
been and still is used as agricultural ground. Existing surrounding uses include 
agricultural and residential uses. There are no other commercial or industrial areas 
located close to the project site. The proposed colnmercial area would be located 
adjacent to U.S. Highway 20, while the proposed industrial area would abut property 
owned by Alice Hegstead which is currently designated and actually in use as 
agricultural. 
Regarding Walters, no concerns were voiced regarding the location of the Walters access 
due to traffic volume, sight restrictions or vehicle speed, all of which were major issues in the 
Bums' hearing.Io4 Those testifying at the Walters' hearing were primarily concerned with 
property values, buffering, potential pollution from the gravel pit, and more gravel trucks traveling 
county roads.lo5 However, six other industrial properties already existed in the neighborhood area, 
including one already working gravel pit.'OG As stated in the Madison County co~nprehensive plan, 
industrial uses are to be grouped.'07 Approval of the Walters project in an area within city limits, 
'" R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 6, Findings of Fact 
and Conclus~ons of Law, dated June 1,2008, at pp.5-6. 
'"Id, item number 3, Public Hearing transcript on Walter's Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, dated February 
28,2005, at p. 17, LL.8 through p.45, LL.4. 
'" R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 3, Publrc Hearing 
Re: Walter's Concrete dated February 28, 2005, at p. 17 through p 49, LL 2. 
'" R. Vol. 4 Walters Tab 1. 
'" R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 6, Findings of Fact 
and Conclus~ons of Law, dated June 1,2006, pp 14-16. 
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bounded by railroad line, where six other industrial sites, including one gravel pit already are in 
existence, is in full compliance with the comprehensive plan. 
In comparison, the Bums property has no commercial property located near it, while the 
Walters property has a number of both commercial and industrial properties located nearby. Bums 
also proposed the construction of a cement batch plant and provided a number of plans as to the 
location and design of the plant and buildings. Whereas Walters only proposed to dig a gravel pit. 
Decisions by the Board must be "based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive 
plan."'08 The Board has to make its decision on a case by case determination. As stated in 
Southfork Coalition v. Board of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, "comprehensive plans do not 
themselves operate as legally controlling zoning law, but rather serve to guide and advise the 
various governing bodies responsible for making zoning decisions. . . . [Tlhe determination of 
whether a zoning ordinance is 'in accordance with' the comprehensive plan is one of fact. As a 
question of fact, the determination is for the governing body charged with zoning . . . . rr109 
In this case, the Board undertook a factual inquiry as to the relationship between what 
Burns wanted and what the comprehensive plan stated. The Board found the zoning action was 
not in accordance with the comprehensive plan."o The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
itself is evidence that the Board balanced competing interests and reviewed the applicable statutes, 
comprehensive plan, zoning ordinances, and did the appropriate component analysis as required 
by law.'" The problem with the residents and the Board was largely Bums' 10cation.''~ 
'08 Idaho Code 5 67-6535(b). 
'09 ~outhfork Coalition v. BoardofCorr2m i-s ofBonneville Counw, 1 17 Idaho 857,863,792 P.2d 882,888 (Idaho 
1990) (quotations and citations omitted). 
'I0 See, e.g., Ur&ia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,2 P.3d 738 (Idaho 2000); R. Binder with Augmentations from 
Order of December 24,2007, item 6, pp.19-23. 
'I' R. Binder.with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007, item number 6, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, dated June 1,2006, pp.5-24. 
"' R. Transcript from August 11,2006, hearing berore Judge Moss, Case No. CV-2005-255, p:20, LL.4-6; R. Vol. 4' 
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In conclusion, the Walters and Bums projects were so vastly different in type, scope, 
impact, neighboring uses, and distance, that differing decisions on the projects were entirely 
appropriate. The Board made the correct decision in that no violation of law occurred. As such, 
the Board's decision should be upheld. 
Bums further argues the Board should have articulated why the Burns decision was 
different than walters.'13 LLUPA only requires the Board make a written "reasoned statement" as 
to each application, per Idaho Code § 67-6535(a)-(b). This statute provides: 
(a) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall 
be based upon standards and criteria which shall set forth in the comprehensive 
plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or 
county. 
(b) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall 
he in writing and accompanied by reasoned statement that explains the criteria and 
standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and 
explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable provisions of the 
comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent 
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record. ' I 4  
. . . 
Idaho Code $ 67-65I9(4) also states: 
(4) Whenever a governing board or zoning or planning and zoning commission 
grants or denies a permit, it shall specify: 
(a) The ordinance and standards used in evaluating the 
application; 
(b) The reasons for approval or denial; and 
(c) The actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain a 
pennit. 
Burns Tab 14. 
"3 Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3, 2007, p.19. 
Idaho Code $ 67-6535fa)-(b). 
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Here, the Board made a reasoned statement as to Burns' application and did not have to 
compare it to Walters' or any other applicant's application for that matter. For these reaspns, the 
Board's finding must be further upheld. 
C. Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002) 
should not be extended to require that oral testimony of lay witnesses be supported 
by other credible evidence before such lay testimony ean be adopted. 
In essence, Bums states that if the Board allegedly failed to follow the Evans ~t Board oj 
Commissioners of Cassia County case, it would be a procedural error under Idaho Code § 
In Evans v. Board ofCom 'rs of Cassia County, this Court held that "[ilt would not be 
feasible to require those conducting this type of hearing, who frequently are not trained in the law, 
to accept only the evidence which would be admissible in a court proceeding. Here, the Board 
properly considered substantial evidence and heard testimony of those individuals who had an 
interest in the  proceeding^.""^ This Court is to "consider the proceedings as a whole and to 
evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light of practical considerations 
with an emphasis on fbndamental fairness and the essentials of reason decision-making."116 The 
Board's factual findings are not clearly erroneous in this case because it is supported by substantial, 
competent, although conflicting evidence.'17 
In this case, the credibility of the witnesses and evidence was assessed first hand by the 
Board, both at the February 28,2005 comprehensive plan public hearing,"* as well as the review 
of the record once again on April 13,2006."~ This Court will not substitute its judgment for that 
"'Evans, 137 Idaho 428,447,50 P.3d 443,432 (Idaho 2002). 
Idaho Code 5 67-6535. 
" ' ~ e e  e.g., F+iends ofFa~m toMarket, 137 Idaho 192, 196,46 ~ . 3 d  9, 13 (Idaho 2002). 
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 26. 
R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of Decemher.24,2007", item numher'5, Public  eari in^ 
dated April 13,2006, at p.1, LL.l-13. 
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of the zoning agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.'20 "[A] local zoning 
agency's interpretation of its own ordinances, even if questionable, without more, does not 
necessarily amount to a violation [.I"'~' 
Bums argues to this Court that the Board's reliance on oral claims and testimony was 
improper without further e v i d e n ~ e . ' ~ ~  Idaho Code requires the Board to "provide an opportunity 
for all effected persons to present and rebut e~idence.""~ Furthcr, the APA sets out exactly what 
is supposed to he included in an agency record found in Idaho Code 5 67-5249. This includes in 
part, evidence received or considered, notices, melnorandum and transcripts of the record. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence also set out the framework for determining when witnesses 
may testify and to what they may testify. Once a witness has been qualified to testify in a given 
issue, the weight ultimately assigned to that witness' testimony is left completely to the trier of fact. 
Neither the Rules of Evidence, nor case law, requires a trier of fact to assign more weight to the 
testimony of an expert as opposed to a lay person. Indeed, Idaho Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 
states as follows: 
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the witness in the form 
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue, 
and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the 
scope of Rule 702. 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
' I 9  1d at p. 3,  LL. 8-25; p.4, LL.1-25; p.5, LL.1 
j2' Lamar Corp v Czty of Twzn Falls, 133 Idaho 36,39,981 P.2d 1146,1149 (1999); Idaho Code 3 67-5279(1). 
12' Evans v Board of Corn 'rs of Cassia County, 137 ldaho 428,447,50 P.3d 443,432 (Idaho 2002). 
'22 Appellant's Opening Brief dated December 3,2007, p.19. 
'23 Idaho Code 5 67-6534. 
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expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
In this case, the record is full of experiences from fife-long residents of Madison County 
and citizens who had done their research before testifj4ng. Examples of this include Val Ball, 
living across the road from Bums' proposed site who testified that he can only get his truck up to 
15 miles per hour before he hits the top of the overpass and a turning lane would not help the 
traffic.lz4 The record is also full of people that thoroughly reviewed the comprehensive plan and 
zoning ordinances.Iz5 The same matter was repeated at the February 28,2005 public hearing in 
front of the B ~ a r d . " ~  Also included were documents from the public regarding their review of 
industrial zones, Madison County zoning ordinances, and the number of homes surrounding the 
proposed site.Iz7 
Hence, the standard, if one even exists from Evans v. Board of Comrn 'rs ofcassia County, 
has been met in that the Board had the opportunity to hear numerous comments from the audience, 
surrounding cities, as well as statements from various local attorneys and from Burns. 
Additionally, there were numerous exhibits, written documents, and tapes entered into evidence 
for the Board's review, and the witnesses appeared so the Board could assess their credibility 
firsthand. The evidence heard by the Board was substantial and competent, although it was not 
un-contradicted; but the evidence does not need to lead to a certain conclusion, it need only be of 
sufficient quantity and probativc value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as 
the fact finder."' For these reasons, the Board's decision must also be upheld. 
124 R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 14; Planningand Zoning Minutes December 16,2004, p.10. 
'" id., atpp.11-18. 
'26 R. V01.4 Burns Tab 26 at 4-13. 
12' R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 9; R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 10. 
12' Mann v. Safiway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,7Y6,518 P.2d 1194, 1998 (Idaho 1974). 
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D. The Board's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 
"To hold that a finding is not clearly erroneous, there must be substantial evidence in the 
record to support the finding."'2q "The 'substantial evidence rule' is said to be a 'middle position' 
which precludes a de novo hearing but which nonetheless requires a serious review which goes 
beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity."'30 Even under the APA, "[tlhe court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the evidence on questions of fact."I3' 
Substantial has been further described as follows: 
Bv substantial. it is not meant that the evidence need be un-contradicted. All that is 
required is that the evidence be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. It is not - - 
necessary that the evidence be of such quantity or quality that reasonable minds 
must conclude, only that they could conclude.'32 
Even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, an agency's factual 
determinations are binding on the reviewing court so long as the determinations are supported by 
substantial competent evidence in the record.'33 
Substantial and competent evidence is less than a preponderance of evidence, but more 
than a mere scinti11a.I~~ This Court wrote, "the substantial [competent] evidence rule requires a 
court to determine 'whether [the agency's] findings of fact are rea~onable.""~~ 
"The governing body charged with making zoning decisions 'in accordance with' the 
Comprehensive Plan must 'make a factual inquiry into whether requested zoning ordinance or 
12' Pace v. Hymas, 11 1 Idaho 581,588,726 ~ . 2 d  693,700 (Idaho 1986). 
'" Id. (internal citations omitted.) 
"' Idaho Code 5 67-5279(1). 
Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 ldaho 732,736,518 P.2d 1194,1998 (Idaho 1974) (a case dealing with substantial 
evidence in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but equally applicable in actions for judicial review of 
the Board action in this case). 
Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofsun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 166 P.3d 374,378 (Idaho 2007). 
Evans v. Hara's, Inc, 123 Idaho 473,478,849 P.2d 934,939 (Idaho 1993). 
13' Pace v. Hymas, 11 1 Idaho 581,589,726 P.2d 693,701 (Idaho 1986) (internal citations omitted). 
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amendment reflects the goals of, and takes into account those factors in, the Comprehensive Plan 
rr9136 in light of the present factual circumstances surrounding the request. In looking at the totality 
of the record, considering the proceedings as a whole, and evaluating the adequacy of the 
procedures and resulting decision in light of practical considerations according to Idaho Code 5 
67-6535(c), the Board's decision should be upheld. 
As stated in the Appellant's Opening ~ r i e f , ' ~ '  Burns spends a lot of time discussing the 
transportation, traffic and safety of the north interchange of Highway 20 and the Salem Road. 
James Pline gave a written report that was included in the Bums presentation, and the 
audio-visual report, which was played for the Board during the hearing.'38 Mr. Pline based 
portions of his report on the 2003 Trafic Analysis perfonned by the Dyer Group, and the 2004 
Sqfety Analysis perfonned by John W. Becker of the Idaho Transportation Department. 139 Both 
are included in the Appendixes of his written report.140 Burns also relied on parts of the Madison 
County Transportation Plan, also known as the Keller ~ e ~ o r t , ' ~ ~  and on portions of the report 
from the Idaho Transportation Department. 14' 
Mr. Pline stated in his audio-visual report that he had spent approximately two to three 
hours actually viewing the intersection at issue prior to issuing his report.'43 It is unknown what 
time of day or year he reviewed the intersection. He said that the sideline from the westbound US 
~vians v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (Idaho 2003); ciling Bone v. City ofLewiston, 107 Idaho 
844,850,693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Idaho 1984). 
R. Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, p.21. 
138 R. Exhibit 11 and 14 (James L. Pline, Trafflc Analysis, Burns Holdings, LLC, Salem Road, North of US 20 
Interchange, December 9,2004). 
O9 Id, at Exhibit 11. 
I4O Id, 
14' R. Exhibit 10, Keller Associates, Madison County Transportation Plan, June 2004. 
'42 R. Exhibit 4-5, Idaho Transportatioo Department, Crashes by Year and Severiry US 20 IC 337 (Salem IC) 
2000-2003. 
143 R. Exhibit 14 (James L. Pline, Audio Visual Report for Burns Holdings, LLC). 
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Highway 20 off ramp to the Burns property access was 373 feet.144 He also said the Salem Road 
traffic north of the interchange north ramp intersection traveling both directions was 4,190 
vehicles per day.I4' He said the collision summary for the north interchange since 2003 was 15 
collisions, none of which occurred north of the interchange north ramp terminal inter~ection. '~~ 
Mr. Pline's reports, however, gave little credibility to the concerns regarding safety voiced by 
those actually using the roadway routinely, if not daily, as testified at the hearings held on the 
Taylor application, the hearings before the Commission, and the Board's hearing. Mr. Pline's 
report also appears to have been prepared prior to the dccision of Burns to add commercial 
businesses to the site, since the report indicated that, "future development of the remaining 
property at the site is undetermined at this time. The future development of the remainingproperty, 
type of development, traffic generation and roadway impacts will have to be addressed at a later 
time when that development request is ~ubmitted."'~~ As a result, the proposed commercial usage 
and vehicle impact of combined commercial and industrial uses at the site were never addressed by 
Mr. Pline. 
Mr. Pline also suggests the existing 45 milc per hour speed limit south of the interchange 
on the Salem Road be extended to the north on Salem Road to "mitigate the ramp terminal 
concerns and address the public perceptions."'48 In fact, we learn that the real speed limit on the 
Salem Road is 50 miles per hour throughout the interchange area and a traffic study performed 
I44 R: Exhibit 11, Tab 3, p. 2 (James L. Pline, Tiafic Analysis, Bums Holdings, LLC, Salem Road, North of US 20 
Interchange, December 9,2004). 
14' id at p.3. 
'46 Id. at p.4. 
147 Id. at p.2. 
148 Id. 
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later by the County indicated a higher actual average vehicle speed on the roadway at 57 miles per 
The Traflc Analysis prepared by the Dyer Group in 2003, was included in the appendix to 
Mr. Pline's written report.I5O However, Mr. Pline chose to ignore the warnings of Mr. Dyer as 
inade on Page 2 of that analysis, which said: 
From a safety perspective, everyone is aware that the North interchange has a sight 
distance problem. The bridge structure is on a vertical curve and the off ramp is 
located such that it is difficult to see oncoming traffic, most of which is traveling at 
a high rate of speed. There have been several incidents and nuillemus near-misses 
at this location, and thus it will be wise to assure that the proposed approach into the 
Salein Highway is separated as far as possible from the U.S. 20 interchangeloff 
ramp area to keep from aggravating the situation. Although the recommended 
northbound left turning lane will keep vehicles out of the main traffic stream on the 
Salem Highway, it also presents a potential for visible barrier obscuring the 
south-bound traffic if not properly separated froin the off ramp location, further 
justifying keeping the approach to the north. Is' 
The Dyer Group included as part of its T ~ a f i c  Analysis, a 2003 report from the Idaho 
Transportation Department which indicated average daily traffic on the Salem Highway to be 
6,600 vehicles.'52 
The Saf ty  Analysis prepared by John W. Becker of the Idaho Transportation Department, 
indicated average daily traffic volume on the Salem Road at 6,000 vehicles for 2002.'53 Mr. 
Becker's analysis also indicated that for 2000-2002, there had been four accidents at the 
interchange, three on the westbound off ramp, and one on the eastbound off ramp.'54 Both Mr. 
149 R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmenlations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 1, Public Hearing 
Re: Bums Holding, LLC, dated February 18,2005, at p.88, LL.23 through p.90, at LL.lO. 
ld., Tab 3. 
15' Id., Dyer Group Traffic Analysis. 
152 r r la. 
R. Exhibit 5, John W. Becker, Safely Analysis ofthe Salem Road at the North Rexburg Interclzmzgc, January 2004; 
See also R. Burns Tab 5 at 4,s.  
Id. 
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Becker and Mr. Pline disagreed with the Dyer Group as to the sight distance problem at the 
interchange, hut no reference to this disagreement was made in Mr. Pline's reports. 
Dusty Cureton, the Madison County Road and Bridge Supervisor, testified as aparticipant 
at the hearing before the Board on the Burns application.15s Mr. Cureton had been requested to 
perform a traffic study on the site and report his findings at the hearing.Is6 He said he had figures 
on a study done in 2001, which indicated that 3,300 vehicles used the Salem Highway in a day, of 
which 236 were co~nmercial vehicles or trucks.Is7 NO direction of traffic was listed for the 
vehicles. The average speed of those vehicles was 42 miles per hour, with the highest speed being 
66 miles per hour.I5* He also reported that in his current study, he found that 8,300 vehicles used 
the Salem Highway Erorn the overpass going south, and 3,919 vehicles traveled the Salem 
Highway from the overpass going north.lS9 Of the northbound vehicles, 197 were comrner~ial . '~~ 
The average speed of these vehicles going north was 57 miles per hour and the highest speed was 
84 miles per hour.'6' 
During the hearing, a number of county residents also testified against the proposal and 
directly to these points.162 Of these, several testified specifically about the dangerous condition of 
the north Rexburg interchange, based upon their personal observations and use of this interchange. 
Those testifying specifically about safety concerns at the interchange were Dale Thomson, 
Courtney Ferguson, Harold Harris, Winston Larson, Tarnmie Ostermiller, Gerald Lusk, Jared 
Is' R. VOI. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 1, Public Hearing 
Re: Bums Holdings, LLC dated February 28,2005, at p.88, LL.19-25 through p.90, LL.21. 
Id., p.88, LL.12-14. 
Id., p.88, LL.23 through p.89, LL.19. 
IS8 ~ d .  
Is9 Id., p.89, LL.20 through p.90, LL.14. 
1d.,~.90, LL.13-14. 
16' Id., p.90, LL.8-11. 
16* Id.,p.17, LL.4 thghp .88 ,LL .5 .  
Respondent's Brief- Page 26 
Ostenniller, Ben Romney, Ken Sakota, Rich Leuwellen, Vonda Smith, Lawrence Coates, Colleen 
Coates, Layne Ball, Garth Hillman, Val Ball, and Layle ~ a ~ l e ~ . ' ~ ~  
Though Burns argues the residents' concerns should not be given much weight by the 
county if any weight at all, the fact is these people testified they personally drive the Salein 
Highway and travel over the north interchange on a regular, if not daily basis, and some had 
specific knowledge of accidents and injuries and other safety concerns. These include Harold 
Harris' testimony from the comprehensive plan hearing,'64 Gerald Lusk's testimony regarding 
what he has seen as a school bus driver,'65 Rich Leuwellen, who lives right on that comer,'66 Lane 
Ball, who testified in the last eleven months there had been 15 accidents and over 50 speeding 
tickets at this location,'67 and Val Ball who witnessed six inajor accidents and one or two minor 
ones in the last four months. 16* Mr. Ball, who lives on the northeast comer, observed that during 
the majority of the summer the traffic nearly doubles with people going to and froin the sand 
dunes.'69 Layle Bagley also sees the traffic every morning from 7:00 to 8:30 a.m. and believes that 
no one is going to get a long truck over the hill without backing up traffic clear hack to the next 
comer. 170 
The practical concerns and actual experiences and observations of those living near and 
traveling daily over the road and interchange at issue carried significant weight with the ~ 0 a r d . l ~ '  
Id. 
16' Id., p.35, LL.18 through p.37, LL.25. 
165 Id., p.49, LL.20 through p.50, LL.16. 
166 Id.,p.65, LL.13 throughp.67, LL.13. 
167 Id.,p.75, LL.l-23. 
1681d.,p.81,LL.1 throughp.82,LL.19. 
169 r v  
1U. 
I7O Id.,p.85, LL.18 throughp.87, LL.15. 
171 R. Vol. entitled "Binder with augmentations from Order of December 24,2007,  item number 5, Public Hearing 
Re: Bums Holdings, LLC, dated April 13,2006, at p.53, LL.13 through p.67, LL.6. 
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In this case, the Board found the testimony of the lay witnesses and the Road and Bridge 
supervisor, Mr. Cureton, more compelling in making a determination as to the safety of the 
roadway and intersection at issue. The difference in traffic volu~ne numbers as reported by each 
expert and the use of reports from prior years, led the Board to rely on the current traffic volume 
count made by Mr. C~reton. '~ '  
These lay witnesses did not fonn their opinions based on a few observations at the 
intersection, but on frequent, if not daily usage of the roadway and intersection at all times of the 
day, night and year. The amount of traffic actually using the roadway and number of accidents 
occurring, varied from expert to expert, made it doubly reasonable for the Board to rely on its own 
actual count of vehicles and on the personal observations of those actually and regularly using the 
roadway. While the advent of large cement trucks using the interchange may not increase the 
number of accidents, they would increase the risk of accidents being more serious, and that was 
significant to the Board. Thus, in looking at the documentary evidence and testimony about the 
sight restrictions existing at the interchange, the testimony of those actually driving the 
interchange and living nearby as to its dangers, the testimony regarding the potential increase in 
regular vehicle and heavy truck traffic coming from the proposed cement batch plant, and thc 
potential increase in heavy commercial traffic coming from the proposed commercial property, all 
support and justify the Board's decision regarding traffic and safety at the proposed project site 
The Board's decision relating to traffic and safety is based on substantial evidence, and was 
not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
As to the other items listed in the component analysis brought up by ~ u r n s , ' ~ ~  these too 
were thoroughly discussed in the initial hearing,'74 the rehearing,'75 and analyzed in the Board's 
Id 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of These documents speak for themselves and will not 
be reproduced here, but these too were based upon substantial evidence, and were not arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Finally, the district court agreed with the Board, specifically 
holding that the Board did not violate any constitutional or statutory provisions nor exceed its 
statutory authority; the Board's decision was not made upon unlawful procedure; the Board's 
decision was supported by substantial evidence, and in looking at the entire record, the Board's 
decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of di~cret i0n. l~~ AS such, the Board's decision 
should be upheld. 
E. Burns has not shown a substantial right prejudiced. 
The APA, as stated above, has two requirements for the type of relief outlined in Idaho 
Code $ 67-5279. Burns must first show a specific violation of $ 67-5279(3), and then must show 
that "substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced."'78 This statute is applied instead of 
Idaho Code $67-6535(c) because the APA standard is more specific.179 Idaho Code 3 67-6535(c) 
is helpful, however, in understanding the standards as this Court held in Evans v. Teton County, 
that "I.C. 3 67-6535(c) requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a fundamental right 
in order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA dec is i~n ." '~~  Further, this Court 
noted in Friends ofFarm to Market, that "due process applies to quasi judicial proceedings like 
'73 R. Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, at pp 35-42. 
174 R. V01.4 Burns Tab 28. 
17' R. VoI. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 5, Publ~c Heanng 
dated Apnl 13,2006, at p.6, LL. 14 through p.71, LL.23. 
17' R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 6, Fmdings of Fact 
and Concluszons of Law, dated June 1,2006, at pp 5-23. 
'77 R. Vo1. 3 at 492-505. 
17' Idaho Code $67-5279(4). 
179 Blaha v Board ofAda Counly Comrn'rs, 134 Idaho 770,774,9 P.3d 1236,1240 (Idaho 2000). 
Evans, 139 Idaho 71,76,73 P.3d 84,89 (Idaho 2003). 
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those conducted by zoning boards, and such due process requires notice of the proceedings, 
specific written findings of fact, and an opportunity to be present and rebut e~idence."'~' 
Burns' assertion that it has been deprived of a substantial right is based entirely upon the 
Board's interpretation of the facts. Burns does not challenge procedural defects with LLUPA. In 
fact, the Board's findings and conclusion are supported by substantial and competent evidence and 
Bums had ample opportunity to present and rebut evidence, were notified of all the proceedings, 
and were provided a copy of specific findings of fact, in compliance with Idaho Code 5 67-5279(4). 
Though there was conflicting evidence before the Board, the Board's factual determinations are 
binding on the reviewing court so long as they are supported by substantial competent evidence in 
the record.'82 
This Court in the past has weighed in on what a substantial right is. In Sanders Orchard v. 
Gen County, this Court found that a county basing its decisions upon findings that were not 
supported by any evidence in the record was sufficient to prejudice substantial rights of the 
applicant.'83 Also, in 2002, this Court held that the county commissioners viewing the applicant's 
property did not violate a substantial right of the applicant.'84 
There is also similarity in "takings" cases, where a regulation denies an owner of all 
economically viable use of land. "Takings" would be violative of a substantial right.Ix5 The 
Federal Courts have held that a historical use of land is presumed to be economically viable.Ia6 In 
Is' Friends ofFarm to Market, 137 1daho 192,198,46 P.3d 9, 15 (Idaho 2002). 
"'See, e.g., Friends ofFarm toMarket, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. 
I" Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695,702,52 P.3d 840,847 (Idaho 2002). 
Evans v. Board of Comm 'rs of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428,433,50 P.3d 443,448 (Idaho 2002). 
185See, e.g., C&G, Inc, v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 146,75 P.3d 194,200 (Idaho 2003) (holding 
that a "takings" implicates the Constitution whichin turn was designed to protect substantial rights). 
Is' MacLeod v. Santa Clara County, 749 F.2d 541,545-547 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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MacLeod, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the denial of a proposed commercial 
development was not a taking where the historical agriculture use was permitted to continue.Ia7 
In this case, Bums knew the property's use and purchased it after prior requests to change 
the comprehensive plan designation of the property had been denied. His speculative purchase of 
the ground in the hopes that its zoning would be allowed does not mean the Board denied Burns 
any economic use of the property. Bums is left with the same use the property historically had, and 
the Board's refksal to grant any speculative adventure or re-zone of the property does not 
constitute prejudicing of any substantial right. 
Bums' case is distinguishable from Sanders Orchard v. Gem ~ o u r z t ~ , ' ~ ~  because 
concerning Bums, the Board relied upon numerous written documents and oral testimony 
regarding the placement of the plant and concerns over the proposed zone change. The Board also 
made extensive findings regarding the same. Though the Board did not agree with Bums' ultimate 
dcsire for the use of the property, it cannot be said that in so doing, violating the substantial right of 
Burns. 
Even if this Court were to conclude the Board's decision was not based upon substantial 
evidence, was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion under Idaho Code 5 67-5279, there 
still must be a showing of a substantial right of Bums being prejudice, and Bums cannot make such 
a showing, so their appeal must be denied. 
F. Burns is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal to the district court 
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-117, nor to this Court, whereas Madison County is. 
Where the district court properly applied the law and understood the discretionary nature of 
its action in making or declining the award of fees, this Court will overturn that decision only upon 
Id. 
''' Sanders Orchard v Gem County ex rel Bd ofcounty Corn 'rs, 137 Idaho 695,52 P.3d 840 (Idaho 2002) 
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a showing of abuse of di~cret i0n. l~~ "The appellate court exercises free review over the decision of 
the district court in applying LC. $ 12-1 1 7 . " ' ~ ~  This Court summed up this statute as follows: 
The purpose of Idaho Code $ 12-1 17 is two-fold: First it serves "as a deterrent to 
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy for 
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against 
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have 
made." An award of attorney fees under I.C. 5 12-117 has been distilled into a 
two-part test. Attorney fees must be awarded if (1) the Court finds in favor of the 
person, and (2) the City or County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340,343 
(Idaho 2004). 
The core of this provision then is, "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." As shown 
herein and also as stated by the district court, the Board acted with a reasonable basis in both fact 
and law. Hence, Bums' request for attorney fees and costs should be denied under Idaho Code 5 
12-1 17. 
Bums also seeks reversal of the district court's decision to not award attorney fees under 
Idaho Code $ 12-121. This section is limited to cases initiated by complaint, and does not apply in 
cases of administrative actions and land use decisions initiated by peti t i~n. '~ '  Assuming arguendo 
it does apply, the Board prevailed at the district court below, and it cannot be said the Board acted 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundati~n."~ 
Madison County also seeks attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code $ 12-1 17, which 
provides for an award of attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party if the other party acted 
without a reasonable basis and fact or law. Cowan v. Board ofCom 'rs ofFremont County, 143 
Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247, 1266 (Idaho 2007). In this case, Bums is rearguing facts that have been 
1 8 9 ~ o x  v. Board of Counly Corn'rs, 121 Idaho 684,685,827 P.2d 697,698 (Idaho 1992). 
'90~zscher v Clry ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,355-356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1097-1098 (Idaho 2005). 
Lowery v Board of County Com'rs for Ada County, 117 Idaho 1079,1081-82,793 P.2d 1251,1253-254 (Idaho 
Respondent's Brief - Page 32 
carefully considered by the Board more than once in this case, and consequently, acted without a 
basis in law or fact. 
As stated above, it is unclear if attorney fees and costs are applicable under Idaho Code 5 
12-121 to this action. Cowan, above, cites Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. ofpittsburgh, P.A. v. Dixon, 
141 Idaho 537, 542, 112 P.3d 825, 830 (Idaho 2005) holding ‘‘Lain award under this statute is 
appropriate if the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or defended 
Erivolously, unreasonably or without fo~ndation."'~~ If proper, Madison County requests the same. 
This appeal was brought so this Court could attempt to second guess the Board's findings of fact. 
Consequently, this appeal is made frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
An award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code $ 5  12-1 17 and 12-121 is thus 
warranted to Madison County. 
G. Granting Burns' request for a comprehensive plan change would amount to invalid 
spot zoning. 
Bums' request, if granted, would require invalid type two spot zoning in Madison County. 
As stated in Evans v. Teton County: 
A claim of "spot zoning" is essentially an argument the change in zoning is not in 
accord with the Comprehensive Plan. There are two types of "spot zoning." Type 
One may simply refer to a re-zoning of property for a use prohibited by the original 
zoning classification. The test for whether such a zone re-classification is valid is 
whether the zone is in accord with the Comprehensive Plan. Type Two spot zoning 
refers to a zone change that singles out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the 
permitted use in the rest of thc zoning district for the benefit of an individual 
property owner. This latter type of spot zoning is i n~a1 id . l~~  
As stated above, the Burns property has been designated both by the comprehensive plan 
and zoning ordinance as transitional/agriculture. The property surrounding Bums' property is also 
1990); Knight v. Dep't oflnsurance, 119 Idaho 591,593,808 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Ct. App. 1991). 
'92 See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131,136,75 P.3d 185,190 (Idaho 2003). 
'" C w a n  v. Board of Corn 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247, 1266.(Idaho 2007). 
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designated in the comprehensive plan as transitionallagriculture, and in the zoning ordinance is 
designated as either agriculture or transitional agricultural two. The actual use of the Burns 
property has always been agricultural. The actual use of the property surrounding the Bums 
property has also either been agricultural or residential. There are no commercial zones or 
grandfathered uses in the county within some miles of the Bums property. There are also no light 
industrial zones. 
The Madison comprehensive plan lists as a goal, at p. 22, "it shall be the responsibility of 
Madison County to protect the agricultural industry from inappropriate and uncontrolled 
residential or non-agricultural growth, given that this industry is the economic mainstream of the 
~ o u n t ~ . " ' ~ ~  To further this goal, the comprehensive plan lists the following objectives, also from 
p. 22 as: "I) to keep urban-type (high traffic commercial, non-agricultural industrial, high-density 
residential) growth within the areas of city impact, as established by mutual agreement between 
the cities and the county." 
In addition, the Madison County comprehensive plan, at p. 17, states:'96 
It is the policy of the citizens to allow and encourage such development in the 
appropriate industrial zones. The citizens will encourage the recruitment of clean 
industries that will coinplement their county. The majority of industrial uses shall 
be located within area of impacts where city services are more likely to be available. 
Exceptions to this might include mining, farm services, and the initial processing of 
commodities including grain elevators and "fresh pack" potato plants. 
The County will encourage the grouping of industrial uses in land developed as an 
industrial park. 
In' Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76-77,73 P.3d 84,89-90 (Idaho 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
'" R. Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007, item number 6, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, dated June 1,2006, p.7. 
'" 6d. at p. 14. 
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Bums' own appendixes attached to the Appellant's Opening Brief show that the parcel of 
land is surrounded by farm land as also testified to by Alice Hegstead, an elderly widow, who was 
concerned about the impact the project will have on the value of her ground.'97 Directly east of the 
Bums property, across the Salem Highway, is the home of Val Ball, including his outbuildings and 
agricultural land.'98 On the west, the Bums property is bordered by more farm ground. On the 
southwest comer of the Bums property, the neighboring use is a fonner gravel pit, now reclaimed 
as a pond, and then still more farm ground. Bums' demand to amend the zoning of this property 
from transitional/agricultural to commercial with light industrial, is a demand for the Board to 
improperly "spot zone" its property. This property is not within an area of city impact, nor are 
there any light industrial or commercial areas anywhere in the vicinity of the Bums property. The 
surrounding ground is all classified in the comprehensive plan as transitional/agricultural, and the 
uses of the surrounding properties are limited to agricultural or residential uses. 
As a result, it is impossible to comply with the Madison County comprehensive plan by 
placing an industrial use and commercial zone dropped right in the middle of a 
transitional/agricultural zone. As such, re-zoning the Bums property would single out "a parcel of 
land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an 
individual property owner."'99 Hence, this Court should not allow a re-designation of the Madison 
County comprehensive plan for the benefit of the Bums' property as requested. 
R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number I, Public Hearing 
Re: Bums Holdings, LLC dated February 28,2005, at p.41. 
'"Id.,atp.81. 
"'  vans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,7677, P.3d 84,89-90 (Idaho 2003). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Coult should affinn the district court's decision 
denying Bums' request for a colnprehensive plan designation change. In addition, Madison 
County should receive an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
Respectfully submitted this 
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